Own Initiative Investigation into possible systemic maladministration within the Corradino Correctional Facility

Published January 31, 2025

Own Initiative Investigation into possible systemic maladministration within the Corradino Correctional Facility

Published January 31, 2025

The Investigation

In 2021, as a result of persistent media reports, alleging violations of basic human rights and non-observance of prison regulations within the Corradino Correctional Facility, and after NGO “Moviment Graffitti” wrote to the Ombudsman highlighting these concerns, the Ombudsman Mr Anthony Mifsud decided to conduct this investigation in accordance with sub-article (2) of Article 13 of the Ombudsman Act (Cap. 385).

As allegations focused primarily on specific incidents and, more particularly, on the conduct of the Director of Prisons, Colonel Alexander Dalli, the period under review spanned from July 2018 (when Col. Dalli was appointed to this post) to December 2021 (when he relinquished his position and was replaced by Mr Robert Brincau).

Nevertheless several instances of maladministration emerged that had their roots beyond the period in question, namely:

Over the course of the investigation, evidence was gathered from a broad range of sources, including current and former inmates, uniformed and non-uniformed prison staff, and other individuals summoned as witnesses.

On the basis of the evidence, three focal points of maladministration clearly emerged:

1.      Endemic dysfunctionality in prison management

Notably, the Director of Prisons who succeeded Col. Dalli, Mr Robert Brincau, was unable to furnish copies of SOPs or the prescribed “special registers.”

This dysfunctionality was further underscored by a report submitted to the relevant ministry on 9 December 2021 by Prof. Anton Grech, Dr Gorg Grech, and Dr Janice Formosa Pace, which, although was limited to mental health issues, unveiled serious shortcomings across various operational aspects of the CCF.

2.      Degrading treatment of prisoners

3.      Use of intimidation as an operational tool

The investigation found that intimidation was frequently resorted to in pursuit of specific goals, chiefly to maintain discipline, to prevent the introduction of contraband, and to safeguard overall prison security.

Intimidation often led to or was employed alongside degrading treatment. It is important to note that the goals—such as upholding prison security—are not inherently unlawful.

However, the prevailing mentality within the CCF was that “any means” were acceptable to achieve these ends, thus undermining the rule of law and fostering abuses of human dignity.

Paradoxically, some inmates highly dependent on illicit substances appeared to tolerate or even welcome these forms of intimidation, particularly when combined with treatment approaches that skirted, or exceeded, acceptable standards.

Conclusions

Imprisonment, meaning deprivation of liberty, constitutes the punishment imposed by a competent court following a finding of guilt for a crime or contravention. A detainee should not be further punished by means of dehumanising or degrading treatment.

As provided by the Prisons Regulations, the conditions of incarceration are not to be aggravated beyond what is necessary for legitimate segregation or for maintaining security, order, and discipline.

Furthermore, for unconvicted prisoners, the state of deprivation of liberty is intended solely to protect the integrity of ongoing criminal proceedings. Hence, whether a prisoner is convicted or not, any additional imposition on their liberty must:

  1. Conform with the law;
  2. Be necessary in a democratic society; and
  3. Genuinely aim to achieve justifiable segregation or maintain security and discipline.

Based on the evidence gathered and examined during the investigation, it is evident that systemic maladministration occurred at the Corradino Correctional Facility (CCF) under nearly all headings of Article 22(1) and (2) of the Ombudsman Act (Cap. 385), except for the category specified in paragraph (c) of Article 22(1).

The investigation reached the following principal conclusions for the period under examination:

1.      Systematic breach of prison regulations

A widespread disregard for the Prisons Regulations has resulted. Likewise, a dysfunctional administration (notably, the absence of SOPs) and the approach adopted by certain prison officials, who often sought to emulate the stringent methods of the Director of Prisons in combating contraband and illicit drug use.

2.      Ignorance and emulation of a “tough attitude”

Many officials did not fully comprehend their roles or legal obligations. In some instances, they appeared to model their conduct on the Director’s harsh stance, thereby intensifying maladministration and abuses.

3.      Ends and means

There is no doubt that the CCF was, during the period under review, rendered significantly less permeable to drugs. However, this investigation firmly upholds the principle that in a State governed by the rule of law, legitimate ends cannot justify means that contravene statutory requirements or undermine human dignity.

The Office of the Ombudsman finds that the Moviment Graffitti report was substantially accurate.

Regarding the occurrence of prison deaths and suicides during the period, the Ombudsman is morally convinced that vulnerable inmates were negatively impacted by the harsh treatment upon their admission and thereafter, potentially contributing to tragic outcomes.

This observation does not prejudice any pending or future criminal proceedings, which remain exclusively within the purview of the competent courts.

It is not the function of the Ombudsman’s Office to determine who is to shoulder political responsibility for the systemic maladministration at the CCF during the period in question. That determination is reserved for others.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are being submitted:

1.      Implementation of National Audit Office (NAO) recommendations

The Ombudsman endorses without reservation NAO’s recommendations concerning the Correctional Services Agency (CSA), particularly those identified in the NAO’s Follow-Up Report of November 2024 as either partially implemented or unimplemented. These recommendations address key issues arising from dysfunctional internal prison organisation, including:

2.      Adoption of the Board of Inquiry’s recommendations

The Ombudsman fully endorses all the recommendations made by the Grech Board of Inquiry which highlighted the need to review the excessive power accorded to the Director of Prisons, which can lead to abuses in areas such as the withdrawal of remission and the imposition of solitary confinement—both of which should fall within judicial remit.

3.      Enhanced scrutiny and transparency

The Ombudsman advocates for greater media access to places of confinement. Had the media been granted routine inspection rights, many problematic situations that arose may have been prevented or mitigated. The Director of Prisons should therefore formulate a clear policy or protocol governing such visits, ensuring no improper discrimination, and balancing the legitimate demands of security and inmate privacy.

4.      Use of Article 8(4) of the Prisons Act

The investigation reveals that most prison officials were unfamiliar with the legal provision that grants certain individuals—particularly members of the judiciary—access to the CCF.

The ‘Official Visitors’ Book’ provided by law was unavailable when requested, indicating inadequate procedural observance.

The Ombudsman urges greater awareness and application of this legal provision.

5          Psychological assessments of key personnel

The Ombudsman recommends thorough psychological evaluations for staff appointed to the CCF, especially the Director of Prisons (who also serves as CEO of the CSA) and senior prison officials. These evaluations are critical in an environment as complex and stressful as a total institution. Failure to ensure psychological fitness risks both maladministration and reputational harm to the responsible political authorities.

6          Role of the Commissioner for Inmates Welfare and Development

The Office of the Commissioner was created on 17 December 2021 following the Grech Board of Inquiry.

The Office has enabled numerous inmate complaints to be resolved rapidly in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman.

However, many inmates still view the Commissioner for Inmates Welfare and Development as merely an employee of the Ministry, rather than as an independent authority.

Additional measures are therefore necessary to transform the independence of the Commissioner from perception to reality in order to ensure that inmates feel confident in approaching the Commissioner without fear of bias or reprisal.

This press release and the final report are being published by virtue of Article 29(2) of the Ombudsman Act.

 

 

 

 

Final Report - Own Initiative Investigation